Security-Informed Safety: If it's not secure, it's not safe by Bloomfield, R. E. et al.
Bloomfield, R. E., Netkachova, K. & Stroud, R. (2013). Security-Informed Safety: If it's not secure, 
it's not safe. Paper presented at the 5th International Workshop on Software Engineering for 
Resilient Systems (SERENE 2013), 03rd - 04th October 2013, Kiev, Ukraine. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Bloomfield, R. E., Netkachova, K. & Stroud, R. (2013). Security-Informed Safety: 
If it's not secure, it's not safe. Paper presented at the 5th International Workshop on Software 
Engineering for Resilient Systems (SERENE 2013), 03rd - 04th October 2013, Kiev, Ukraine. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3097/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
Security-Informed Safety: If It’s Not Secure, It’s Not Safe 
Robin Bloomfield
1,2
, Kateryna Netkachova
1
, Robert Stroud
2
 
1
Centre for Software Reliability, City University London 
2
Adelard LLP 
{reb,rjs}@adelard.com 
Kateryna.Netkachova.2@city.ac.uk 
Abstract. Traditionally, safety and security have been treated as separate disci-
plines, but this position is increasingly becoming untenable and stakeholders are 
beginning to argue that if it’s not secure, it’s not safe. In this paper we present 
some of the work we have been doing on “security-informed safety”. Our ap-
proach is based on the use of structured safety cases and we discuss the impact 
that security might have on an existing safety case. We also outline a method 
we have been developing for assessing the security risks associated with an ex-
isting safety system such as a large-scale critical infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction 
We all benefit from resilient and dependable critical infrastructures. Many of these 
systems (e.g. in transport, energy) have significant safety implications and therefore 
have to be engineered using high integrity principles and the disciplines involved in 
safety critical engineering and assurance. But in order to make them dependable, all 
of the dependability attributes have to be addressed, not just safety but also security. 
Otherwise, a safety-critical system – one that can harm or injure people – could pro-
vide attackers with a potential mechanism for causing widespread damage or panic, 
and it is credible that such systems could become the target of malicious actions. 
Traditionally, safety and security have been treated as separate disciplines, with 
their own regulation, standards, culture, engineering but this is increasingly becoming 
infeasible and there is a growing realization that security and safety are closely inter-
connected: it is no longer acceptable to assume that a safety system is immune from 
malware because it is built using bespoke hardware and software, or that it cannot be 
attacked because it is separated from the outside world by an “air gap”. In reality, the 
existence of the air gap is often a myth and safety systems are built using commodity 
hardware and software, connected together and communicating with each other using 
commodity network equipment and standard communication protocols. Thus, safety 
systems operate in an open environment and they need to be secure in order to be 
safe.  
Broadly speaking, safety is concerned with protecting the environment from the 
system whereas security is concerned with protecting the system from the environ-
  
ment. Security and safety can both be viewed as kinds of dependability (in the sense 
that each is concerned with mitigating the effects of a particular kind of failure) and 
the two disciplines uses similar techniques to identify potential failure modes and 
assess their impact on the overall system. Thus, there is considerable overlap between 
safety and security methods, although the focus is different and in some cases safety 
and security requirements can be in conflict.  
It is important for a system to remain safe and secure despite changes to the envi-
ronment, in other words, to be resilient to change. We find it useful to distinguish two 
types of resilience: 
• Type 1: resilience to design basis threats and events. This could be expressed in the 
usual terms of fault-tolerance, availability, robustness, etc.  
• Type 2: resilience to beyond design basis threats, events and use. This might be 
split into those known threats that are considered incredible or ignored for some 
reason and other threats that are unknowns.  
Often we are able to engineer systems successfully to cope with Type 1 resilience but 
Type 2 resilience is a more formidable challenge. Traditional safety methods address 
Type 1 resilience, but Type 2 resilience requires a security-informed safety perspec-
tive that deals with safety and security concerns in an open and hostile environment in 
which everything is interconnected and the threats are continually changing and 
evolving. 
In principle, achieving interworking between safety and security should be 
straightforward. Both are sophisticated engineering cultures that emphasize the need 
for good process, the importance of risk analysis and the need for assurance and justi-
fication. However, these similarities are superficial and once we examine the concepts 
and principles that underpin safety and security standards and justifications, we find 
that there are significant challenges that need to be overcome: 
• Concepts and terminology. The commonalities between safety and security are 
frequently obscured by the use of different concepts and terminologies. To achieve 
a shared understanding of the key concepts within each domain, there is a need to 
establish a lingua franca or even a common ontology.  
• Principles. There are many overlaps between safety and security principles, but 
there are also some significant differences in emphasis and some potential con-
flicts. For example, “defense in depth” is an important architectural principle for 
both safety and security that depends on the use of multiple, and as far as possible 
independent, barriers. However, security considerations are likely to challenge the 
effectiveness and independence of safety barriers. 
• Methodology. Risk assessment is a fundamental step in safety and security analy-
sis, but the underlying threat model is different. There is a need for a unified meth-
odology for assessing the threats to the safety and security of a system.  
• Security-informed safety cases. Security considerations can have a significant 
impact on a safety case. For example, there needs to be an impact analysis of the 
response to security threats and discovery of new vulnerabilities and reduction in 
  
the strength of protection mechanism. This suggests a greater emphasis on resili-
ence of the design. 
• Standards. Safety standards already require “malevolent and unauthorized actions 
to be considered during hazard and risk analysis”, but the standards framework 
for dealing with security-informed safety needs to be more explicitly designed than 
is currently the case. In particular, the relationship between generic and domain-
specific safety and security standards needs to be clarified, and terminological and 
conceptual differences need to be resolved. 
As part of our ongoing research into security-informed safety [1][2], we have been 
exploring these challenges and in this paper we describe some of the progress we 
have made. Our approach is based on the use of structured safety cases based on 
Claims-Arguments-Evidence and we discuss the impact that security might have on 
an existing safety case. We also outline a method we have been developing for as-
sessing the security risks associated with an existing safety system. 
2 Security-Informed Safety Cases 
Safety cases are an important part of goal based safety regulation and corporate gov-
ernance [3]. Explicit safety cases are required for military systems, the off shore oil 
industry, rail transport and the nuclear industry.  
A safety case has to support an argument that the requirements placed upon a sys-
tem are met. As such, the safety case contains claims about the properties of the sys-
tem and, following a systematic approach, has arguments that demonstrate that these 
claims are substantiated or rebutted by evidence.  
Current safety case practice makes use of the basic approach developed by  
Toulmin [3] where claims are supported by evidence and a “warrant” or argument that 
links the evidence to the claim, as shown in Fig. 1. There are variants of this basic 
approach that present the claim structure graphically such as Goal Structuring Nota-
tion (GSN) [5] or Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE) [6][7]. 
Claim
Warrant Backing
Evidence Assumptions
Claims
Argument
Grounds
 
Fig. 1. Toulmin’s formulation of a claim 
There are several different ways of constructing such a justification. The three main 
approaches can be characterized in terms of a safety justification “triangle” [8]: 
  
• Claims about the systems’ safety behavior (positive properties). 
• The use of accepted standards and guidelines. 
• Analysis of potential vulnerabilities (negative properties). 
The first approach is claim-based—where specific safety claims for the systems are 
supported by arguments and evidence at progressively more detailed levels. The se-
cond approach is based on demonstrating compliance to a known safety standard. The 
final approach is a vulnerability-based argument where it is demonstrated that poten-
tial vulnerabilities within a system do not constitute a problem—this is essentially a 
“bottom-up” approach as opposed to the “top-down” approach used in goal-based 
methods. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of ap-
proaches can be used to support a safety justification, especially where the system 
consists of both off-the-shelf (OTS) components and application-specific elements. 
2.1 Analyzing the Impact of Security on a Safety Case 
Security considerations have an impact on each aspect of the safety justification trian-
gle. It is necessary to make claims about security properties as well as safety proper-
ties, demonstrate compliance to both security and safety standards, and consider a 
broader set of potential threats and vulnerabilities. The hazards remain the same but 
the judgments we make about the likelihood of a hazard leading to an accident might 
be different because we are no longer dealing with a benevolent threat model. 
We can investigate the impact that security might have on a case by considering 
the three aspects of Claims-Arguments-Evidence, and deciding whether we need to 
• Change the (top level) claims, if any 
• Augment the arguments 
• Change how we deal with evidence 
In terms of methodology, the steps are: 
• Express safety case about system behavior in terms of Claims-Arguments-
Evidence  
• Review how the claims might be impacted by security 
• Review security controls to see if these can be used to provide an argument and 
evidence for satisfying the claim 
• Review architecture and implementation impact of deploying controls and iterate 
the process 
Using a structured argument helps to clarify the relationship between safety and secu-
rity issues. Consider a simplistic claim of the form: 
System is safe and secure 
This can be factored into: 
(security only issues) + (safety and security issues) + (safety only issues) 
The cases approach provides a way of defining what is in each category. 
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Fig. 2. Outline safety case for device 
To illustrate our approach, we use a simple skeleton of a safety case for a device 
such as smart sensor or medical infusion pump, as shown in Fig. 2. For the purposes 
  
of this example, the case focuses only on the behavior of the device. In practice, a full 
justification would also consider compliance with standards and legislation. 
2.2 Outline of Safety Case Structure 
The top level claim C0 in Fig. 2 is that the service provided by the device is “OK” – 
in this context, “OK” might mean that the device delivers the required service, is op-
erable, and is safe. 
If the device is a safety device such as an alarm or protection system, its whole 
function will be safety related. If the device has other principal functions, safety might 
be an essential but additional property to the requirement to be reliable and available. 
The claim shown in Fig. 2 is factored into two sub-claims, one about whether the 
device is adequate now (C11) and one about whether it is adequate in the future 
(C12). The sub-claim about the future is then made more concrete by considering all 
the future events that the device should deal with (e.g. component failures, changes to 
environment). Some of these events will be handled by component-level fault toler-
ance and recovery mechanisms and some will handled by escalating the device’s fault 
handling to another system or device. We then expand the claim that the device is 
“OK initially” into claims about the user’s training (C22) and the configuration of the 
device (C21). We then progress down the supply chain – the device has to be pur-
chased and supplied. We assume our trust in the device comes from an evaluation of 
an example device, either by the supplier, user or third party, so we need to make a 
claim (C42) that the supplied device is in some sense equivalent to the evaluated one. 
(This can be a tricky claim to substantiate when there are “small” changes to digital 
systems). 
The case continues with a claim that the safety properties have been satisfied (C51) 
and we begin to expand this by considering whether the dependability attributes have 
been specified correctly (C61) and implemented adequately (C62). We are also con-
cerned that negative properties such as vulnerabilities and hazards have been identi-
fied and mitigated (C52). In addition, we are not only concerned that the component 
should behave as required but also that it should minimize some of the risks elaborat-
ed in higher parts of the case. For example, the design should minimize deployment 
risks (C66), help the user learn how to use the device, and enunciate failures clearly. 
These could be defined as additional safety properties that the device should support, 
in addition to its safety functions. 
In practice, architecting a case is a specialized activity and there is much research 
at present on how this can better be achieved and documented. Each of the claims and 
arguments discussed above would need to be more carefully justified in a real case, 
perhaps by reference to a more technical model of the system. 
2.3 Impact of Security on Claims and Arguments 
We now review the case structure and assess the impact of considering security. We 
first consider the impact on the top-level claims and arguments, as shown in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Impact of security on safety case 
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on 
case structure 
C0 
Deployed 
device 
delivers 
service 
OK 
Cases include the need to consider the envi-
ronment of the system but this is often left 
implicit or factored out. For security-informed 
cases this would not be adequate as we need to 
define what assumptions we are making about 
the threats to the system. For example, the 
nature of attackers, their resources, any claims 
about perimeter security that are outside the 
scope of the system safety case.  
• Add explicit threat 
models and scenari-
os to environment 
description. 
• Consider an explicit 
claim about resili-
ence to emphasize 
the need for adapta-
tion and recovery in 
an uncertain world. 
C0 
Deployed 
device 
delivers 
service 
OK 
Security is classically thought of as encom-
passing the attributes of availability, integrity 
and confidentiality. Integrity and availability 
are considered intrinsically as part of a safety 
case.  
In terms of confidentiality, there is a need to 
consider it in more detail for two reasons: 
• Assets in the system could have value and 
become targets for attack (e.g. control algo-
rithms, “recipes”)  
• Information such as product details, project 
management information and tool chain de-
tails could be acquired and used to escalate 
or enable an attack. 
So there are issues of confidentiality of the 
process as well as that of the system/product. 
• Add new argument 
about confidentiali-
ty. This might  
involve new claims: 
• System does not 
leak information 
that leads to un-
acceptable in-
crease in risk of 
successful attack.  
• System protects 
confidentiality of 
assets that have 
direct information 
value. 
• Add a lower level 
claim that the design 
and deployment 
minimize these new 
hazards. 
The next level of the case continues with a split on time in which we distinguish 
the current and future properties. The handling of future events needs be extended to 
address security properties as shown in Table 2. 
  
Table 2. Impact on claim “OK in future” 
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on  
case structure 
C12 
OK  
future 
• We need to add a claim that the 
future system is robust to mali-
cious threats and changes as 
well as to the safety related set 
of changes that are normally 
considered. 
• We need to address the change 
in nature and intensity of the 
threat environment and the 
weakening of security controls 
as the capability of the attacker 
and technology changes. This 
may have major impact on pro-
posed lifetime of installed 
equipment and design for re-
furbishment and change. 
• Make argument wider in scope 
to consider security related 
events. 
• Add claim about handling these 
events (C23 in Fig. 3) in both 
preventative and reactive man-
ner. 
• Review with respect to different 
time bands. Ensure the approach 
and environmental assumptions 
are documented in the System 
Design Basis. 
There are several claims where the claim can remain as formulated but will be im-
pacted with more security informed detail needed as the claim gets expanded in a 
more detailed case. This is detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Impact of security on safety case 
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on  
case structure 
C21 
Configured 
device OK 
Configuration of the device will 
need to take into account the 
design basis threats. For example, 
by changing process so there is 
more independent checking, 
changing access to configuration 
tools/consoles and providing 
design features to assist in this. 
• No change to actual claim but 
there will be more security in-
formed detail as the claim gets 
expanded in a more detailed 
case. 
• Claim C53 will be expanded in 
scope to address configuration 
issues. 
  
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on  
case structure 
C22 
Training 
OK 
Training will also have to include 
security awareness and changes 
to use of the device and its design 
that may have been necessary. 
• No change to actual claim but 
there will be more security in-
formed detail as the claim gets 
expanded in a more detailed 
case. 
• Claim C53 might need to be 
expanded in scope to address 
security-training issues. 
The next part of the case has two important claims. The first is the claim that the 
evaluated device is “OK” (C41), and the second is the claim that the supply chain 
delivers a device equivalent to the evaluated device (C42). Although neither claim 
needs to be modified at this stage, it is worth noting that C42 is particularly signifi-
cant from a security perspective. 
The case continues with a consideration of the evaluated device. This leads to three 
claims: firstly that the safety properties have been satisfied (C51), secondly that the 
vulnerabilities and hazards have been identified and mitigated (C52), and finally that 
the design is suitable (C53). Security might have a major impact on all of these claims 
as detailed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Impact of security on safety case (cont.) 
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on 
case structure 
C51 
Safety proper-
ties satisfied 
The properties that the device imple-
ments are likely to increase in scope to 
include functionality arising from im-
plementing security controls and from 
addressing security attributes such as 
confidentiality. There will need to be 
careful design to ensure that these do not 
conflict with safety-related reliability 
and availability requirements, and in 
practice some trade-offs or compromises 
may be necessary. There may also need 
to be increased verification effort to 
show independence of critical function-
ality from failures of other software or 
components. 
• Generalize C51 to 
include security and 
safety properties. 
Additional controls 
are dealt with in C53. 
• Add confidentiality to 
the attribute expan-
sion and extend into 
C61/C62. 
• There will be a major 
impact on more de-
tailed levels of the 
case, which will need 
to balance the trade-
offs between safety 
and security. Demon-
strating that the secu-
rity risks are ALARP 
will be problematical. 
  
Claims Comments Illustrative impact on 
case structure 
C52 
Vulnerabilities 
and hazards 
addressed 
The importance of vulnerabilities in the 
software and design can be greatly im-
pacted by the security design basis 
threats. While product vulnerabilities 
will already have been addressed, the 
claims will need to be increased in depth 
and also in scope as issues of lifecycle 
threats and malicious threats to evidence 
need to be included. For example, alt-
hough safety standards already require 
the trustworthiness of tools to be justi-
fied, the inclusion of security concerns 
means that the possible malicious inclu-
sion of code by tools or the deliberate 
non-reporting of findings will also need 
to be considered.  
The current case enu-
merates over classes of 
vulnerabilities and haz-
ard (only product vul-
nerabilities are shown). 
This will need to be 
expanded to include 
lifecycle and product 
issues. In the example in 
Fig. 3, claims C63, C64 
and C65 have been in-
cluded to address this. 
One approach would 
be to map the claims and 
evidence to the organi-
zations responsible for 
them.  
The organization 
boundaries could also be 
shown explicitly on the 
case diagram. 
C53 
Design OK 
This requires two major changes: the 
first due to the need to minimize de-
ployment hazards by improving existing 
functionality (e.g. changes to user inter-
action protocols) and the second due to 
the implementation of security related 
controls. The properties that the device 
implements are likely to increase in 
scope to include functionality arising 
from additional security controls and 
from addressing security attributes such 
as confidentiality. 
Additional detail has 
been added to the claim 
about deployment haz-
ards (C66). As the case 
design proceeds, this 
could be replaced by 
claims about security 
controls being imple-
mented and existing 
design features re-
moved, improved or 
extended to reduce risks.  
The overall impact of security on the original safety case structure is shown in  
Fig. 3. The dashed lines indicate nodes that have been added and nodes where securi-
ty will have a major impact. As can be seen from the number of dashed nodes in  
Fig. 3, a significant portion of the safety case will need to address security explicitly. 
In some instances this will lead to substantial changes to the design, the implementa-
tion process and the justification. 
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Fig. 3. Outline of security-informed safety case for device 
2.4 Identifying Relevant Security Controls 
Security controls are techniques and measures that can be used to address security 
requirements and reduce the risk of a security breach to an acceptable level. Security 
  
standards and guidelines often include catalogues of security controls and recommend 
a baseline set of controls to deal with each level of security risk. Thus, mapping each 
security claim in a security-informed safety case onto one of more security controls 
provides a basis for arguing that the security claim can be satisfied, whilst also 
demonstrating compliance with security standards and guidelines. 
As an illustration, we have taken some of the security related claims in  
Fig. 3 and identified relevant controls from the NIST SP 800-53 catalogue of security  
controls [9], as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Mapping controls to claims 
Claims NIST 800-53 Controls 
C0 
Deployed device 
delivers service 
OK 
Planning (PL) 
PL-2 System Security Plan 
Program Management (PM) 
PM-9 Risk Management Strategy 
Risk Analysis (RA) 
RA-2 Security Categorization 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
System Acquisition (SA) 
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management 
C21 
Configured de-
vice OK 
Access Control (AC) 
AC-2 Account Management 
AC-3 Access Enforcement 
AC-5 Separation of Duties 
AC-6 Least Privilege 
Configuration Management (CM) 
CM-2 Baseline configuration 
CM-3 Configuration Change Control 
CM-4 Security Impact Analysis 
CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
CM-7 Least Functionality 
2.5 Security-Informed Risk Assessment 
The purpose of a case is to demonstrate that the risks associated with a system and 
well understood and reduced to ALARP. Thus, in order to develop a security-
informed safety case, it is necessary to perform a security-informed risk assessment. 
An important observation from our preliminary example is that a significant por-
tion of a security-informed safety case will need to address security explicitly. In 
some instances this will lead to substantial changes to the design, the implementation 
process and the justification. For example, the following areas are particularly signifi-
cant from a security perspective and need more scrutiny in a security-informed safety 
case: 
  
• Supply chain integrity. 
• Malicious events post deployment, that will also change in nature and scope as the 
threat environment changes 
• Weakening of security controls as the capability of the attacker and technology 
changes. This may have major impact on proposed lifetime of installed equipment 
and design for refurbishment and change. 
• Design changes to address user interactions, training, configuration, and vulnera-
bilities. This might lead to additional functional requirements that implement secu-
rity controls. 
• Possible exploitation of the device/service to attack itself or others. 
In order to address these additional security risks within a case, we need to find a way 
of combining safety and security risk assessment. With this in mind, we are develop-
ing an adapted process that can be used where safety cases and risk assessments al-
ready exist but need augmenting to make them security-informed. Thus, our approach 
is different from other work in avionics, for example, where the idea is to develop an 
integrated approach from scratch. 
Our method for performing a security-informed risk assessment is based on  
Adelard’s experience of using such techniques to analyze large-scale critical infra-
structure systems that need to be both safe and secure. The process consists of eight 
iterative steps to perform the risk assessment (see Table 6). The security-informed 
safety case is constructed in parallel with this process. 
Table 6. Risk assessment process 
Step Brief description 
Step 1 – Establish 
system context and 
scope of assessment 
Describe the system to be assessed and its relationship with 
other systems and the environment. Identify the services 
provided by system and the system assets. Agree the scope 
of and motivation for the assessment and identify the stake-
holders and their communication needs. Identify any exist-
ing analyses, e.g. safety cases. 
Step 2 – Identify 
potential threats 
Define the threat sources and identify potential threat scenar-
ios. 
Step 3 – Refine and 
focus system models 
Refine and focus system models in the light of the threat 
scenarios to ensure that they are at the right level of detail 
for an effective risk analysis. 
Step 4 – Preliminary 
risk analysis 
Undertake architecture based risk analysis, identifying con-
sequences and relevant vulnerabilities and causes together 
with any intrinsic mitigations and controls. Consider doubts 
and uncertainties, data and evidence needs. 
Step 5 – Identify 
specific attack sce-
narios 
Refine preliminary risk analysis to identify specific attack 
scenarios. Focus on large consequence events and differ-
ences with respect to existing system. 
  
Step Brief description 
Step 6 – Focused 
risk analysis  
Match threat sources to attack scenarios and prioritize possi-
ble consequences according to the level of risk. As with Step 
6 the focus is on large consequence events and differences 
with respect to existing system. 
Step 7 – Finalize risk 
assessment  
Finalize risk assessment by reviewing implications and op-
tions arising from focused risk analysis. Review defense in 
depth and undertake sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. 
Consider whether design-basis threats are appropriate. Iden-
tify additional mitigations and controls. 
Step 8 – Report  
results 
Report the results of the risk assessment to stakeholders at 
the appropriate level of detail. 
In parallel with this process, the security/risk case is developed progressively 
throughout the risk analysis process to synthesize risk claims, arguments and evi-
dence. The details of how security risks are mapped onto claims are very dependent 
on the specific case. Also, the case can be developed and issued at different levels of 
detail, depending on the intended stakeholder audience. 
2.6 Harvesting Evidence 
Another part of the case – the compliance part – needs to efficiently and thoroughly 
deal with standards compliance, both as a goal in its own right and also to provide 
evidence about the behavior of the product. With appropriate tool support, evidence 
can be harvested directly from the development life cycle and used to populate a CAE 
structure, as shown in Fig. 4. This illustrates the use of a questionnaire-based evalua-
tion tool to assess whether a system conforms to relevant safety and security stand-
ards. Evidence generated by this evaluation tool can then be imported into a security-
informed safety case automatically, provided a link has been made between the ques-
tionnaire and the relevant areas of the case.  
 
Fig. 4. Questionnaire-based tool for harvesting evidence 
  
3 Conclusions and Future Work 
Our analysis of the impact of security on a safety case suggests that a significant por-
tion of a security-informed safety case will need to address security explicitly. In 
some instances this will lead to substantial changes to the design, the implementation 
process and the justification of the system. This highlights the need for an integrated 
methodology for addressing safety and security together – our security-informed risk 
assessment approach represents an initial step in this direction. 
Security controls are similar to the methods and techniques that safety standards 
recommend in order to achieve particular safety integrity levels. However, the con-
cept of security control embraces a wide range of different interventions covering 
process, product and organization. In contrast, safety standards are typically based on 
an engineering life cycle model. In principle it should be possible to relate safety mit-
igations to security controls, but in order to perform such an analysis, it will be neces-
sary to define a common way of classifying controls and mitigations. 
In our current work, we are refining our ideas and developing our methodology by 
undertaking a risk assessment and security-informed safety justification of a realistic 
system that needs to be both safe and secure. We also plan to develop tool support for 
our methodology. In particular, we wish to explore how to: 
• Build security-informed safety cases more efficiently 
• Link our cases to models with the potential for more rigorous reasoning 
We have started developing a software tool for harvesting evidence and dealing with 
compliance. This is an evaluation tool based on a security and safety questionnaire, 
which should help us to analyze whether a system conforms to various known safety 
and security standards. Additionally, a plugin is being developed for Adelard’s assur-
ance case tool (ASCE) that will enable us to import the evidence generated by this 
evaluation tool into a security-informed safety case. 
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